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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE AUTOMOBILE AND
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
RICHARD J. SALISBURY and
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
AGENCY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12511

BRIEF 0 F APPELLANT'
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by an insurer against its agent for
an alleged violation of authority in binding a risk which
resulted in a loss to the insurer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was submitted to the jury by way of three
special interrogatories. On two of the interrogatories the
jury found that there was no preponderance of the evi1

dence that the defendant had received the most recent
edition of the Prohibited List prior to binding the coverage or that "underwriting guides" is defendant's possession had been violated when the coverage was bound. On
a third proposition the jury found the defendant had a
duty of inquiry concerning persons having two moving
violations within the past three years.
The trial court then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that because Diversified would have been
instructed to not bind any coverage on this particular risk
had it made inquiry of State Auto, its failure to make such
an inquiry was the proximate cause of State Auto's loss
and therefore judgment was entered for plaintiff in the
amount of $19,758.74 plus interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment below and
judgment in its favor as a matter of law, no cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be referred to as they appeared m
the court below. All italics in this brief have been added.
In the early part of 1964 the plaintiff insurer ("State
Auto") contacted the defendant insurance agency ("Diversified") in an effort to secure an agency agreement
with the latter (R. 186). Subsequently, on July 10, 1964
an agency agreement was signed. See Exhibit 1-P. The
manuals to be used in writing insurance for State Auto
were received by Diversified in August of 1964 (R. 190).
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The defendant Richard J. Salisbury and his father
were the principal stockholders in Diversified at the time
it became an agent for State Auto. Diversified, at that
time, was already an agent for approximately ten other
companies of which five or six were motor vehicle insurers (R. 186).
One of Diversified's customers was a Mr. Farrell
Crawforth (R. 202). On October 1, 1965 Mr. Salisbury
took a binding automobile insurance application from Mr.
Crawforth. The application was sent to State Auto's regional office in Denver. Immediately prior to that time
Mr. Crawforth had insured his automobiles with the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. Mr. Salisbury placed
the October 1, 1965 insurance application with State
Auto because of more favorable insurance rates.
The front page of Mr. Crawforth's application listed
the following traffic citations: July 13, 1963, improper
turn; August 7, 1963, speeding; August 20, 1964, speeding. On the reverse side of the application Mr. Salisbury
entered the appropriate information and signatures to
make the insurance immediately effective.
The application was received by State Auto's Denver
branch office on Monday, October 4, 1965. When received, no diary date was established with respect to the
application (R. 15 - answer to interrogatory No. 17). The
application was held by State Auto at its Denver office for
an additional two weeks, until Friday, October 15, 1965,
before any action was taken upon it (R. 15 - answer to in·
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terrogatory No. 15). State Auto then returned the application, stating, because of the prior violations, it did not
desire to underwrite the coverage.
During the early morning hours of October 16, 1965,
and prior to the receipt by Diversified of State Auto's
letter rejecting Mr. Crawforth's application, Mr. Crawforth was involved in a serious automobile accident. In
settling subsequent claims against Mr. Crawforth resulting from this accident, State Auto incurred loss and expenses of $19,758.74.
This action was then filed by State Auto alleging
Diversified had exceeded its authority by taking a binding
application in contravention of the company's prohibited
list.
In the trial court State Auto argued that the coverage
should never have been written for Mr. Crawforth because
anyone with more than two moving violations within the
past three years would have been on the company's 1964
Prohibited List. Diversified denied ever having received
a Prohibited List which would have precluded binding
Mr. Crawforth's application. Diversified pointed out that
the Prohibited List contained in its manual when Mr.
Crawforth's application was bound was a 1957 edition
list containing no prohibition for persons with two or
more moving violations within the past three years. See
Exhibit 22-D pages 153 and 154.
1

Mr. Salisbury never even saw the 1964 Prohibited
List upon which State Auto relied until after suit was
filed (R. 195, 240).
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The mail clerk for State Auto, Mrs. Elsie Waggoner,
admitted the manuals sent to Diversified on August 7,
1964 contained only the 1957 prohibited list (R. 247-48,
277-80). She further admitted there was no record of having sent the 1964 Prohibited List to Diversified (R. 264).
The jury logically found that State Auto had failed to
show Diversified received the later 1964 Prohibited List
(R. 149) .
The Sales Agency Contract between the parties prohibited binding risks, as is here relevant, only if the risk
was noted on the company's Prohibited List on "specific
underwriting guides." See Exhibit 1-P. Nowhere in the
Sales Agency Contract is the latter term defined.
In addition to granting Diversified binding authority, the Sales Agency Contract defines the relationship
between the parties:
"RELATIONSHIP"
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed
to create the relationship of employer and employee
between the Parties hereto. It is distinctly understood and agreed that the Second Party shall, under
the provisions of this contract, independently act
in accordance with his own ideas and exercise his
own judgment. It is understood and agreed that
the Second Party shall not bind or obligate the
State Automobile Casualty Underwriters in any
manner whatsoever except as herein specifically
provided or, as defined in the manuals and
underwriting guide(s)." Exhibit 1-P page 2.
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At trial State Auto offered into evidence several letters sent to Diversified for the apparent purpose of showing Mr. Salisbury was aware he could not write binding
coverage for persons in Mr. Crawforth's situation. The
letters all concern the rejection of applications sent to
State Auto by Diversified. Mr. Salisbury testified that
State Auto rejected about 10 percent of all automobile
insurance applications Diversified submitted. (R. 242).
None of the letters purported to be underwriting
guides respecting the binding of future applications. Indeed each of the letters gives several reasons why the application was rejected:
Exhibit 6-P concerns two violations and two accidents
within the past three years. The reply simply states: "Although the applicant was not at fault, we do not feel that
we would want to provide coverage on the basis of the
frequency of these occurrences."
Exhibit 9-P is in conjunction with the return of an
application on seven vehicles operated by a sand and
gravel corporation. The application states State Auto is
no longer writing sand and gravel equipment unless it
is strictly owner operated and additionally mentions that
since one operator is under 21 years of age it did not care
to insure drivers on such risks under 25 years of age.
Exhibit 10-P notes that the applicant was involved in
three accidents in three years and, though only one was an
"at fault" accident the company returned the application
because the "applicant's wife is somewhat accident prone."
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Exhibit 11-P returns the application because it concerns a vehicle over 15 years of age, lists one accident and
two violations in the past three years, and having had
insurance declined.
Exhibit 12-P refers only to a motor vehicle violation
by the applicant. The company states ..We do not feel
that the violation in this instance is far enough in the past
to warrant consideration."
Exhibit 13-P is Diversified's memo to which the previous exhibit responds.
Exhibit 14-P declines the application because of
underage operators, a sports car, and two violations in
the last two years. This is the only letter making reference to the Prohibited List. It states: ..This would also put
the risk on our Prohibited List." It is not clear from this
comment whether the combination of the three facts or
any single one puts the risk on the Prohibited List.
Exhibit 15-P rejects an application because the principal operator of the two automobiles is under 25 years
of age and has had two speeding violations in the last
three years.
Exhibit 16-P concerns the rejection of the Farrell
Crawforth application: It simply states:
"It is noted that the applicant has had three

violations in the last three years. We do not care
to write any risk who has had two or more occurrences in the last three years. Consequently, we
feel it would be best in this instance to decline
coverage and return the application to you."
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The matter was submitted to the jury by way of
three interrogatories. Proposition No. 1 stated:
"Prior to October 1, 1965, the defendant received the 1964 edition of the Prohibitive List."
(R. 149).
The jury found no preponderance of the evidence
either way.
Proposition No. 3 stated:
"When the defendant gave Farrell Crawforth
insurance coverage, the defendant violated underwriting guides received by the defendant before
October I, 1965, which were not in the manual."
(R. 150).
The jury again found no preponderance of the evidence either way.
Proposition No. 2 stated:
"Prior to October 1, 1965, in the exercise of
reasonable care, the defendant had enough notice
to require the defendant to inquire about the prohibition of insuring applicants with two moving
violations within three years." (R. 150)
The jury found this proposition to be "true."
The court then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the defendant's failure to
make an inquiry as referred to in the special verdict, proposition No. 2, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
loss in settling the claims against Crawforth (R. 153, 154).
Judgment for State Auto was then entered for
$19,758.74.
8

ARGUMENT
POINT I. IT WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF DEFENDANT'S AUTHORITY TO
WRITE A BINDING INSURANCE APPLICATION FOR FARRELL CRAWFORTH.
State Auto solicited Diversified to become its agent.
Having thus created the agency relationship, and having
initiated this suit, it had the burden of showing Diversified exceed its authority in binding Mr. Crawforth's application. See Instruction 9-C (R. 138).
Diversified had clear authority under the .. Sales
Agency Contract" to bind applications for at least twenty
days. See Exhibit 1-P, pages 2 and 3. That contract placed
only one limitation upon Diversified's authority to
bind coverage which is relevant to this action:

''Any changes or additions to the binding
authority as herein provided shall be governed by
the specific underwriting guides and/ or manuals
furnished by the First Party [State Auto]". Id.
Any limits upon Diversified's binding authority
therefore had to come from either, (1) the manual State
Auto furnished Diversified or, (2) "specific underwriting
guides."
The jury resolved the issue whether the Crawforth
application had been bound contrary to the 1964 Prohibited List with their "no preponderance" finding in response
to the following proposition:
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"Prior to October 1, 1965, the defendant received the 1964 edition of the Prohibitive List."
(R. 149).
"Underwriting guides" were the second limitation
upon Diversified's authority to bind applications.
The Sales Agency Contract does not define "underwriting guides." State Auto presented no evidence which
would have clarified the term.
The jury was asked in proposition No. 3 whether
"underwriting guides" not in State Auto's manual had
been exceeded when Diversified bound Farrell Crawforth's application:
"When the defendant gave Farrell Crawforth
insurance coverage, the defendant violated underwriting guides received by the defendant before
October 1, 1965, which were not in the manual."
(R. 150).
The jury again found favorable to Diversified:
"No, preponderance of the evidence either
way." (R. 150)
Even though the Sales Agency Contract limited Diversified's binding authority only as to prohibitions in
the underwriting guides or the manual, the trial court
over defendant's objection, injected a third issue sounding
in negligence which was presented to the jury as Proposition 2 of the special verdict.
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It stated:
"Prior to October 1, 1965, in the exercise of
reasonable care, the defendant had enough notice
to require the defendant to inquire about the prohibition of insuring applicants with two moving
violations within three years." (R. 150)
The jury found this proposition to be "true." (R. 150)
Proposition 2 was drafted by the trial court. Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that this issue was
properly before the jury, it was prejudicial error to have
submitted this interrogatory to the jurors without giving
them any instructions for resolving the issue. The proposition contains such terms as "reasonable care" and
"enough notice". Nowhere in the instructions are these
terms explained or referred to in any way. Indeed no instruction touches upon proposition 2 in any regard.
It is clear from the language of proposition 2 that
the jury did not find Diversified exceeded its authority
to bind applications. The proposition simply states Diversified had a duty to inquire concerning persons with
two moving violations within the past three years. It is
an obvious fact of modern life that persons seeking insurance also need coverage pending any inquiry concerning their insurability. The finding in proposition 2 is not
one which declares Diversified was without authority to
bind applications pending any inquiry into the applicant's
insurability.
The finding in proposition 2 was that Diversified had
a duty to inquire of State Auto concerning this particular
11

risk. How the jury arrived at the finding that such a duty
existed is purely speculative, however, because the trial
court gave the jurors no instruction whatsoever by which
they could determine such a duty existed.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, such a duty existed, however, this duty was fulfilled when Diversified
sent Mr. C1·awforth's application to State Auto. Nothing
in the agency agreement prohibited an inquiry in this
matter. Indeed it should be obvious that the ideal way for
an agent to submit relevant information to an insurer on
an insurance applicant would be by using the insurer's
own forms!
Proposition 2 injected an issue of negligence into
this lawsuit. Negligence is the breach of a duty. The
duties an agent has to his principal are determined by the
agency agreement. As such unless there is a breach of a
duty under the agency agreement the agent incurs no
liability to the principal.
This principle is well stated
Agency 2d § 376:

in

Restatement of

"The existence and extent of the duties of the
agent to the principal are determined by the terms
?f the agreement between the parties, interpreted
rn light of the circumstances under which it is
made, except to the extent that fraud duress
illegality, or the incapacity of one or bo;h of
parties to the agreement modifies it or deprives it
of legal effect.''
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Comment "a" to section 376 states:
"Agency is a relation based upon the manifestations of consent of the parties and hence, except where the manifestations do not have legal
effect, the duties of both parties are based upon
them."
The authorities are to the effect that whether an
agent is liable for negligence must be based upon an inquiry into the terms of the agency agreement. In E. S.
Harper Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America, 91
Idaho 767, 430 P.2d 658, 662 (1967), the Idaho Supreme
Court restated this principle:
"Obviously, the agent assumed only limited
duties in acting as Harper's agent. The relationship created was based upon the parties mutual
manifestations of consent, that the agent should
act in certain respects on Harper's behalf and that
the agent's duties existed only by virtue of that
understanding with Harper. Where the principal
sues the agent in tort upon the theory that the
agent has negligently dealt with affairs entrusted
to him by the principal, the question whether the
agent has improperly performed depends upon his
agreement with the principal, since this determines
the scope of the agent's undertaking."
And in Baumgartner v. Burt, 148 Colo. 64, 365 P.2d
681, 683 (1961) it is stated:
"The relationship between an agent and his
principal is a contractual one and the extent of
the rights and duties of each is to be found in the
express or implied terms of the agency contract."
Nothing in the Sales Agency Contract forbids Diversified from binding an application pending an inquiry to
State Auto whether it desires to accept the application.
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It is hornbook law that an agent is free from liability
when he exercises discretion in a good faith judgment:
"If the mode or manner of executing the authority is not expressed, the principal is bound by the
act of the agent if it be within the scope of his
authority, although it be not done in the manner
that the principal desired, or would himself have
done it." 2 C.J.S., Agency 1345. § 121c
Neither is an agent an insurer against losses due to
the good faith exercise of judgment in the exercise of discretion:
"An agent who contracts to perform personal
services does not undertake to render perfect service and mere errors in judgment not due to want
of care of diligence, or to fraud or unfair dealing
are not actionable. An agent is not an insurer
against losses due to honest mistakes or errors of
judgment, and if he acts in good faith and with
reasonable skill and ordinary care and diligence,
he will not be liable for losses which his principal
sustains." 3 Am. Jur. 2d 585 Agency § 206.
See also United States Liability Insurance Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.3d 586, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 463
P.2d 770, 774 (1970), where the California Supreme
Court stated:
"Liability is not incurred by a mere error of
judgment in the exercise of discretion unless the
error is based on want of care or diligence."
The second sentence in the Sales Agency Contract
under the paragraph entitled "Relationship" required Diversified to exercise independent judgment and use its
discretion:
"It is distinctly understood and agreed that
the Second Party [Diversified] shall, under the
14

prov1s10ns of this contract, independently act in
accordance with his own ideas and exercise his own
judgment." (Exhibit 1-P page 2).
State Auto, having created the agency relationship
and having required Diversified to exercise its own judgment, and having given Diversified binding authority except where specifically prohibited by the manual or underwriting guides, it cannot now be heard to complain of the
consequences of a good faith exercise by Diversified of
that authority granted to it.
The contract defining Diversified' s binding authority
was drafted by State Auto. It cannot be found from the
contract that Diversified was prohibited from binding Mr.
Crawforth's application.
Any instructions Diversified received from State Auto
via the letters giving several reasons for rejecting an application were ambiguous. An agent is not liable for an
honest mistake as to ambiguous instructions. 3 C.J.S. 31
Agency § 148. Furthermore, if there is any ambiguity in
the agency contract that Diversified was without authority
to bind the risk then such ambiguity must be construed
against State Auto and broadly in favor of Diversified.
Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969).
The trial court's judgment not only ignored the agency
contract but in effect construed the contract strictly against
Diversified!
In light of the jury's findings that Diversified had no
notice that Mr. Crawforth's application was on State
Auto's Prohibited List in its manual or in "specific under-
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writing guides" it was clearly erroneous for the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of State Auto. That judgment
should be reversed.
POINT II.
STATE AUTO IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING DIVERSIFIED'S AUTHORITY TO BIND
FARRELL CRAWFORTH'S APPLICATION.
An estoppel, in the context of this case, refers to the
prejudicial reliance of Diversified upon some act, conduct
or nonaction of State Auto. 16A Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice 280 §9081 (1967).
More specifically, an insurer's failure to repudiate
an asserted unauthorized issuance of a policy under circumstances which result in the agent being misled or assuming the position different than he would have assumed
creates an estoppel. 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice 358 §8781 (1967).
The evidence in this case clearly showed that State
Auto's actions were prejudicially misleading to Diversified.
At trial, State Auto called Mr. Elwood Johnson, the
resident vice president of the Denver branch office at the
time Mr. Crawforth's application was sent to the Denver
office (R. 282). Mr. Johnson explained that it was State
Auto's policy to consider applications concerning normally prohibited risks:
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"I assure you we did not invite or seek that
kind of business, but we felt it was a duty and obligation we owed to our agents." (R. 301).
With respect to persons in Mr. Crawforth's risk category, the following testimony took place:

"Q.

But you in some instances did take a risk
like that?

A.

Wehave.

Q.

And you wouldn't intend, by any correspondence or anything of that type, from
precluding the agent to submit that type of
risk to you?

A.

No sir." (R. 302)

It is clear in this fact situation that State Auto's conduct was prejudicial to Diversified. Mr. Crawforth had
written his insurance previously through Diversifed. Diversified had placed the prior coverage with Fireman's
Fund. Because Diversified represented many companies,
a fact of which State Auto was aware, it had a duty to act
with reasonable promptness upon any application submitted to it.
Mr. Crawforth's application was taken on Friday,
October 1, 1965. It was received in the Denver office of
State Auto on Monday, October 4, 1965. The information
concerning Mr. Crawforth's past traffic citations, which
State Auto asserts as a basis for the application being on
the Prohibited List, is found very conspicuously on the
front page of the application. See Exhibit 23-D. No action was taken upon the application during the first week
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m which it was received - not even a diary date was
established with respect to it (R.15). Again, during the
second work week no action was taken upon the application until Friday of that week - October 15, 1965.
State Auto therefore "sat on" the Crawforth application for almost two complete work weeks even though
the violations which it now alleges were so objectionable
were clear on the face of the application and the reverse
side also clearly indicated that the application was bindmg.
In light of the obvious need one has to know whether
he is insured, and an insurance agent's access to several
sources which will accept a given risk, the unfairness of
State Auto's taking no action upon the Crawforth application for two work weeks is readily apparent.
Pending such a determination an applicant as well
as his agent is led to not seek coverage elsewhere. State
Auto then, if its view is adopted, receives an open ended
option on such insurance.
Though State Auto admitted it had previously accepted otherwise prohibited risks, it is not clear from the record whether such applications, if bound, would be backdated to the date of application if the risk were accepted.
It is said in State Auto's manual however:
"If binders are not replaced by a policy effective as of effective date of the binder, same are
subject to prorata earned premium charge." (Exhibit 2-P, page 2.)

18

The normal practice in the industry would be to
backdate a policy to the date the coverage was bound.
Of the courts which have spoken to the inequity of
an insurer's silence in regard to insurance applications,
one opinion is especially helpful in understanding and resolving the problem. In Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
51 N.J. 244, 230 A.2d 4 (1968), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a practice of backdating policies on otherwise prohibited risks to the date of application gave an
agent authority to give a binder for interim coverage. The
court stated:
"As we have already said, it would be unreasonable to expect an applicant for insurance to
give anyone an option, indefinite as to time, to decide whether to sell coverage retroactively with the
applicant holding the interim risk. The practice of
backdating the policy which would lead the applicant to believe the agent is authorized to bind the
risk would if no more were shown, lead an agent
to the same estimate of his authority. That conclusion is so strongly required that an insurer
could escape it only through the plainest instructions to the agent to tell an applicant for immediate coverage in so many words ( 1) that the interim loss will fall upon the applicant if the application is rejected by the company; (2) the period
of time within which the company will act on the
application; ( 3) the objective standard upon which
the company will weigh the application or the absence of such a standard; and (4) that a premium
will be charged at the full rate for the period of
retroactive coverage if the policy should issue."
230 A.2d at 9
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State Auto's own district agent said that State Auto
had a duty to its agents to consider risks such as Mr. Crawforh's (R. 301). Observance of the duty, however, where
State Auto gave no time period in which it would act upon
the application or the criteria upon which a determination
would be made, not to mention the careless practice of not
even putting a diary date upon such applications so as to
assure prompt consideration, is a duty without any benefit
to its agents. Not only would such a duty and obligation
fail to confer any benefits, indeed the uncertain manner in
which such applications were considered operated to the
agents' and the applicants' detriment as each would not
seek insurance elsewhere pending the determination.
In an early Supreme Court case, The Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. McCain, 96 U.S. 84, 85 (1878), the Supreme Court held that the silence of the insurance company when it had a duty to act was equivalent to adoption of the act of the agent:
"Silence then was equivalent to an adoption
of the act of the agent, and closed the mouth of the
company ever afterwards."
State Auto, having vaguely defined the limits of Diversified's binding authority while conferring - even demanding - a broad exercise of discretionary judgment by
Diversified is estopped by its own silence to deny Diversified's authority.
The lower court should have so ruled.

20

POINT

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS.
Upon the court's own motion the matter was submitted to the jury by way of special interrogatories. The
requested instructions submitted to the court were drafted
in the expectation of the matter being submitted to the jury
by way of general verdict. As a result several of these instructions were submitted to the jury without properly
modifying them to conform to the special verdict the jury
was required to give. See, for example R. 142, 144.
It has often been stated that instructions are "the
law of the case" and as such they comprise the applicable
principles of law to which the trial court itself must subscribe. It is clear in this case that the trial court's judgment is contrary to the instructions.
Instruction No. 9-1 stated a principle upon which
judgment should be entered for Diversified:
"If you find from the evidence that Diversified Insurance Agency did not receive or know of
the new Prohibited List issued by the plaintiff after
the agency contract was executed limiting the defendant's binding authority, your verdict must be
in favor of the defendant, Diversified Insurance
Agency and against the plaintiff." (R. 144)

The jury's answers to propositions 1 and 3 require
judgment for Diversified under this instruction.

21

Instruction No. 9-J stated:
"An insurance company cannot reduce an
agent's binding authority without communicating
to the agency specific notice as to change or reduction in his binding authority.
The jury found in propositions 1 and 3 that State
Auto had failed to show Divisified received the 1964 edition of the Prohibited List or any other specific underwriting guides which would have precluded binding the
coverage for Mr. Crawforth. The only issue resolved favorably to State Auto was one requiring defendant to make
an inquiry concerning risks such as Mr. Crawforth's. A
duty to inquire is not the equivalent of a lack of authority.
As stated in Instruction 9-J State Auto could not reduce Diversified's binding authority without communicating to it some "specific notice as to the change or reduction." No such "specific notice" was offered into evidence. Once again the jury's findings that there were no
prohibited lists or underwriting guides received by Diversified which would have prohibited binding the Crawforth risk show that there was no "specific notice" as to
the change or reduction of Diversified's binding authority.
In entering judgment for State Auto, the trial court
ignored the very principles of law it had approved in
submitting the matter to the jury. Proper application of
those principles in light of the jury's findings requires a
reversal of that judgment.
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CONCLUSION
State Auto sought out Diversified to become its
agent. The agency contract subsequently signed was
drafted by State Auto. It limited Diversified's authority
to bind coverage, as is here relevant, only to those prohibited risks in its manual or "specific underwriting
guides" while at the same time demanding a broad exercise of discretion and independent judgment by Diversified.
The Jury found the application Diversified bound
which gave rise to this suit was not a risk prohibited by
either State Auto's manual or its "underwriting guides"
in light of the manual or guides then available to Diversified.
Even if there was some question whether the Crawforth risk was acceptable to State Auto, Diversified still
had authority under its granted rights to exercise judgment to bind the coverage pending some action by State
Auto on the application.
State Auto admitted it had a duty to its agents to consider applications on even prohibited risks. It in effect
demanded an open ended option on such insurance however by not giving any time limits in which it would act
upon such an application.
The application here in question was in State Auto's
office for two full work weeks before any action was
taken on it. Within a few hours of its rejection, and prior
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to receipt of notice of the rejection by Diversified, a loss
was incurred.
Diversified was an agent for several insurers and
could have placed the coverage with other insurers. State
Auto was well aware of this fact.
In reality State Auto is now demanding that its agent
insure it against losses attributed to an ambiguous agency
contract, unbusinesslike office procedures, and its own
lack of diligence in fulfilling a duty to which it readily
admitted.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
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